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INTRODUCTION
My aim is to compare the legal and cultural perspectives on the
Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses from American and Muslim
vantage points. The most important, and at the same time, perhaps,
most difficult, thing to do in comparing perspectives on legal issues
in two different cultures is to avoid the trap of pretending, in the in-
terests of simplification, that either cultural view is monolithic. This
is certainly not true of the American culture, nor is it true of the Mus-
lim culture. This Article studiously attempts to include the nuances
of the debate, not only in the interests of accuracy, but because I be-
lieve that they highlight a conflict within these cultures that is far
more important than the conflict between the cultures that gets most
of the attention of academics and virtually all of the attention of the
press.
We begin by observing that freedom of religion in America is un-
derstood in terms of the two religious freedom protection clauses in
the First Amendment to the Constitution: the Free Exercise Clause
and the Establishment Clause. The concept of free exercise of relig-
ion is well established in Islamic law, having been respected more
consistently in the classical Islamic civilization (7 c.-15 c.) than in
medieval Europe.' The right of tax-paying non-Muslims to freely ex-
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See S.D. GOITEIN, JEWS AND ARABS: THEIR CONTACTS THROUGH THE AGEs 72 (Schocken
Books 1964) (comparing the absence of economic and labor restrictions againstJews in Islamic
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ercise their religion was established in the Qur'an for "the People of
the Book," generally understood to mean followers of previous reve-
lation like Jews and Christians, and usually (but not always) extended
to include other religious groups as well.' The right of Muslims to
variations in the interpretation of the divine law is reflected in the di-
versity of Islamic schools of law.3 In recent decades, however, West-
ern systems (especially America's) have demonstrated a greater toler-
ance of religious minorities and of diversity within the state-
established religion than most Muslim states. At the same time that
some are urging Muslims to abandon the state-establishment of relig-
ion as a necessary condition of democratic reform, many Americans
are challenging the abandonment of religion by the American states.4
These matters, as well as the urgency of questions concerning the
rights of Muslims in America and of non-Muslims in Muslim states,
make clear the significance of a comparison of the American and
Muslim perspectives on freedom of religion.
We shall compare the legal and cultural perspectives on the Estab-
lishment and Free Exercise Clauses from American and Muslim van-
tage points. In the process we shall explore the following questions:
* Do either or both freedom of religion clauses apply to the
states?
* Do either or both clauses reflect a fundamental human right?
* What is the line of separation between the public and private
spheres?
ad-Dean Ahmad, Islam and Dhimmitude: Where Civilizations Collide, 21 #3 AM.J. ISLAMIC SOC. SC.
149 (2004) (reviewing BAT YE'OR, ISLAM AND DHIMMITUDE: WHERE CIVILIZATIONS COLLIDE
(Miriam Kochan & David Littman trans., 2002)). This objection is unfounded, as the poll tax is
in lieu of military service (from which the minorities are unusually exempt) and in any case re-
ligious minorities are exempt from the religious taxes imposed on Muslims. See Imad-ad-Dean
Ahmad, Minaret of Freedom Inst., Plenary Address at the Loyola Institute for Ethics and Spiri-
tuality in Business International Ecumenical Conference: Islam, Commerce, and Business Eth-
ics, (June 10-12, 2004), in BUSINESS AND RELIGIONS: A CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS? 200, 200-15
(Nicholas Capaldi ed., 2005).
2 SeeABD-AL-RAHMAN AZZAM, THE ETERNAL MESSAGE OF MUHAMMAD 53-55 (Caesar E. Farah
trans., 1993) (describing the Prophet Muhammad's tolerance towards Christians and Jews,
based upon their shared belief in the unity of God).
See generally Majid Khadduri, Nature and Sources of Islamic Law, 22 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 3
(1953) (discussing some of the prevalent schools of Islamic Law).
4 See, e.g., T.O. Shanavas, Islam Demands a Secular State, http://www.freemuslims.org/
document.php?id=54 (last visited Apr. 1, 2006) (arguing that the mandates of the Qur'an con-
cerning religious freedom for all religions require a secular state); Alan Keyes, On the Establish-
ment of Religion: What the Constitution Really Says, WORLDNETDAILY, Aug. 26, 2003, http://
www.wnd.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE-ID=34270 (arguing that "the First and 10th
Amendments reserve the power to address issues of religious establishment to the different
states and their people"j.
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* Can a religiously based political system respect both clauses?
I. THE DEBATE IN AMERICA
Relevant to many of the controversies surrounding freedom of re-
ligion in the United States is the question of whether the religious
freedom clauses apply to the several states as well as to the federal
government. Behind this question is the more fundamental question
of whether either or both of these clauses enumerate a fundamental
human right.
These issues have become clearly manifested since the Employment
Division v. Smith5 decision in 1990. In Smith, two Native Americans in
the State of Oregon lost their jobs at a private drug counselin
agency as a result of their use of peyote in their religious practice.
Their employer found the use of peyote problematic because Ore-
gon's drug laws prohibiting the use of peyote made no exemptions
for religious practice at that time.7 In addition to losing their jobs,
the men were also denied unemployment compensation on the
grounds that their dismissal was due to "work-related 'misconduct."'
They sued on the grounds that the Oregon law did not meet the strict
scrutiny test protecting First Amendment rights.9
It is well established in American law that a law may not infringe
on fundamental human rights unless a two-pronged test has been
met. First, the infringement must serve a compelling governmental
interest. Second, that interest must be met in the least restrictive way
possible.'l The State of Oregon argued that the strict scrutiny test
had been met because the "war on drugs" serves a compelling state
interest." They lost the case in Oregon and appealed to the U.S. Su-
preme Court. In a surprise move, a 5-4 majority of the Court held
the Oregon law constitutional, finding that the strict scrutiny test was
irrelevant, that it was sufficient that the law in question was not in-
494 U.S. 872 (1990).
6 Id. at 874.
7 Smith v. Employment Div., 721 P.2d 445, 446 (Or. 1986).
8 Smith, 494 U.S. at 874.
9 Id. at 882-83 (noting that respondents argued that they should be exempted from the
prohibition against the use of peyote unless the Court found a compelling governmental inter-
est for this prohibition).
1I Id. at 894 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("[W]e have respected both the First Amendment's
express textual mandate and the governmental interest in regulation of conduct by requiring
the government to justify any substantial burden on religiously motivated conduct by a compel-
ling state interest and by means narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.").
Id. at 909-10 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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tended to violate freedom of religion, and that such violation was an
incidental consequence to a law of general applicability.
2
Although a state would be "prohibiting the free exercise [of relig-
ion]" 3 in violation of the First Amendment if it sought to ban the
performance of (or abstention from) physical acts solely because of
their religious motivation, the Free Exercise Clause does not relieve
an individual of the obligation to comply with a law that incidentally
forbids (or requires) the performance of an act that his religious be-
lief requires (or forbids). If the law is not specifically directed to reli-
gious practice and is otherwise constitutional, as applied to those who
engage in the specified act for nonreligious reasons, all individuals
must comply. 14 The only decisions in which the Court has held that
the First Amendment bars application of a neutral, generally applica-
ble law to religiously motivated action are distinguished on the
ground that they involve other constitutional protections in addition
to the Free Exercise Clause.
15
We see here the Court declining to give to freedom of religion the
same protection it would give, for example, to freedom of speech.
This ruling virtually invites people concerned about the issue to peti-
tion Congress to defend their religious freedoms under the authority
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Accordingly, an extremely broad
coalition consisting of almost every major religious group in the
country, civil libertarians, and organizations dedicated to the separa-
tion of church and state, succeeded in obtaining the passage of the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA") by the U.S. Congress.
This law, which passed unanimously in the House of Representatives
and 97-1 in the Senate, reinstituted the "strict scrutiny test."' 6
The constitutionality of RFRA was challenged after RFRA was in-
voked by a small Catholic church in Boerne, Texas, seeking to protect
itself from a zoning regulation that prevented a much-needed church
1 Id. at 893 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("The Court today, however, interprets the Clause
to permit the government to prohibit, without justification, conduct mandated by an individ-
ual's religious beliefs, so long as that prohibition is generally applicable.").
13 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
14 See, e.g., Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 167 (1878) ("[Wlhen the offence consists
of a positive act which is knowingly done, it would be dangerous to hold that the offender might
escape punishment because he religiously believed the law which he had broken ought never to
have been made.").
15 See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232-34 (1972) (finding that Wisconsin's com-
pulsory school attendance law, which prohibited Amish plaintiffs from providing home educa-
tion for their children, impinges on the plaintiffs' free exercise of religion and traditional in-
terests as parents with respect to the upbringing of their children); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310
U.S. 296, 304-07 (1940) (finding Connecticut's law requiring Jehovah's witnesses to acquire a
solicitation license unconstitutional under the First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause, and the
Fourteenth Amendment's concept of liberty).
16 Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 1993
U.S.C.C.A.N. (107 Stat.) 1488, invalidated by City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
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expansion."l In a badly fractured decision, the Supreme Court struck
down those parts of RFRA that would affect state governments gener-
ally, leaving it intact only as it affects federal regulations and poli-
cies. ' The Court essentially restricted the congressional authority
under the Fourteenth Amendment (outside the federal arena) to the
rectification of deliberate, systematic discrimination against a demon-
strably victimized group. The opinions of Justices Antonin Scalia and
Sandra Day O'Connor elucidate the sharp divide over whether or not
freedom of religion is a fundamental human right.
In her dissent, Justice O'Connor argued that both Smith and
Boerne misinterpreted the Free Exercise Clause.' 9 Agreeing with the
majority that "Congress lacks the ability independently to define or
expand the scope of constitutional rights by statute,"'  Justice
O'Connor insisted that the historical record reveals that the Found-
ing Fathers "likely viewed the Free Exercise Clause as a guarantee that
government may not unnecessarily hinder believers from freely prac-
ticing their religion, a position consistent with our pre-Smithjurispru-
dence. She noted that "[t] he practice of the Colonies and early
States bears out the conclusion that, at the time the Bill of Rights was
ratified, it was accepted that government should, when possible, ac-
commodate religious practice."2 2 Justice O'Connor justified this ac-
commodation by analogizing freedom of religion to freedom of
speech:
As the historical sources discussed above show, the Free Exercise Clause
is properly understood as an affirmative guarantee of the right to partici-
pate in religious activities without impermissible governmental interfer-
ence, even where a believer's conduct is in tension with a law of general
application. Certainly, it is in no way anomalous to accord heightened
protection to a right identified in the text of the First Amendment. For
example, it has long been the Court's position that freedom of speech-a
right enumerated only a few words after the right to free exercise-has
special constitutional status. Given the centrality of freedom of speech
and religion to the American concept of personal liberty, it is altogether
reasonable to conclude that both should be treated with the highest de-
23gree of respect.
In rejecting what he terms Justice O'Connor's "extravagant
claim,"24 Justice Scalia argued:
17 City of Boerne, 521 U.S. 507.
1s Id. at 519.
19 Id. at 544 (O'Connor,J., dissenting).
20 Id. at 545.
21 Id. at 549.
2 Id. at 557.
23 Id. at 564-65.
24 Id. at 537 (ScaliaJ., concurring).
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The issue presented by Smith is, quite simply, whether the people,
through their elected representatives, or rather this Court, shall control
the outcome of those concrete cases. For example, shall it be the deter-
mination of this Court, or rather of the people, whether (as the dissent
apparently believes) church construction will be exempt from zoning
laws? The historical evidence put forward by the dissent does nothing to
undermine the conclusion we reached in Smith: It shall be the people.
Dismissing the view that freedom of religion is, like freedom of
speech, a fundamental human right, Justice Scalia stands by his posi-
tion in Smith that loss of the right to practice one's religion is the
price you pay to live in a democracy:
It may fairly be said that leaving accommodation to the political process
will place at a relative disadvantage those religious practices that are not
widely engaged in; but that unavoidable consequence of democratic gov-
ernment must be preferred to a system in which each conscience is a law
unto itself or in which judges weigh the social importance of all laws
26against the centrality of all religious beliefs.
When one examines the lineup on the Court in these decisions, one
finds the center (e.g., Justices O'Connor and Souter) supporting the
Free Exercise Clause against a coalition between a right wing that
wants state and local governments to be free to reflect the religious
preferences of majority religions and a left wing without sympathy for
protection from secular infringement on religiously motivated prac-
tices. Religious conservatives who would not want, for example, Or-
thodox Jews to be exempt from proposed anti-abortion laws," have a
common cause with secular liberals who do not want, for example,
Christian Scientists to be exempt from mandatory medical treat-
ments.
An analogous debate exists in the case of the Establishment
Clause. s If the First Amendment ban on infringement of free exer-
2 Id. at 544 (internal citation omitted).
26 Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990).
27 SeeJudith Shulevitz, What Do OrthodoxJews Think About Abortion and Why?, SLATE, Aug. 25,
2000, http://www.slate.com/id/1005956/ (discussing how in the OrthodoxJudaic belief system
the life of the mother is considered more important than that of a fetus, and so abortion itself is
under certain circumstances not considered an absolute moral wrong in the same manner as in
other conservative religions); see also Daniel Eisenberg, M.D., Abortion and Halacha,
http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Judaism/abortion.html (last visited May 4, 2006)
(concerning the fact that abortion is mandatory forJews in certain cases).
28 See Stephen G. Gey, Reconciling the Supreme Court's Four Establishment Clauses, 8 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. (forthcoming 2006) (surveying the debate over the incorporation of the Establish-
ment Clause and concluding that non-incorporation would protect intrastate majority interests
at the expense of local minorities); Kent Greenawalt, Common Sense About Original and Subsequent
Understandings of the Religion Clauses, 8 U. PA.J. CONST. L. 479 (2006) (arguing that the language
of the Establishment Clause lends itself to the interpretation that Congress could not prohibit
states from establishing a religion).
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cise only applies to the federal government, then the ban on an estab-
lished religion only applies to the federal government as well.
II. THE DEBATE IN THE MUSLIM WORLD
Before making the transition to a discussion of religious freedom
in the Muslim world, we need to explore the notions of the public
and private sphere in the two cultures. In the West, religion is gener-
ally considered to be a private matter. This is truer of Europe than of
America, and it is truer of America than it is of the Muslim world.
Americans consider the religious practices in which people engage
inside their churches or within their own homes to be the business of
the practitioners. Yet, it is disputed to what degree American law
protects privacy. While many view the Supreme Court decision on
contraception as evidence of the recognition of a fundamental right
of privacy, 29 that understanding is being challenged by no less a figure
than Robert Bork. Bork has argued that the courts have recognized
no unenumerated right of privacy protected by the Ninth Amend-
ment, but rather some subsidiary privacy rights found in the "shadow"
of the enumerated rights in the Constitution.
In Islamic law, the situation is reversed. Religion governs both
public and private spheres, but the private sphere is explicitly pro-
tected from intrusion by the state."1 Thus, Muslims are forbidden
from drinking alcohol, whether in public or in private, but the Mus-
lim state is denied a means of enforcement in the case of private al-
cohol consumption. 2  Further, Islamic law explicitly protects the
rights of Jews and Christians to use wine in their religious ceremo-
29 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (holding that the Constitution guarantees
certain zones of privacy, making restrictions on the sale of contraceptives unconstitutional).
30 Uncommon Knowledge: Robert's Rules of Order (PBS television broadcast, filmed July 16,
2003), available at http://www.uncommonknowledge.org/800/811.html (discussing how the
Supreme Court'sjurisprudence has come to recognize a right of privacy not explicitly written in
the Constitution's Bill of Rights).
31 As we have noted in our comparison of Islamic law with the American Constitution, the
right of privacy within one's own home is guaranteed in the Qur'an 24:27. Further, early in Is-
lamic law the principle was established that people who consumed wine in private could not be
prosecuted if the evidence was obtained by violating their right to privacy. YUSUF AL-QARADAWI,
THE LAWFUL AND THE PROHIBITED IN ISLAM 315 (1980) (citing the Prophet's belief that those
who search out others' faults are hypocritical and "proclaim their beliefs with their tongues
while their hearts do not confirm what they say"). "The texts prohibiting spying and searching
out people's faults apply equally to the government and to individuals." Id. at 316; see also
Imad-ad-Dean Ahmad, On the American Constitution from the Perspective of the Qur'an and the
Madinah Covenant, 20 #3-4 AM.J. ISLAMIC SOC. SCI. 105, 105-24 (2003) (analyzing the compati-
bility of democracy and constitutionalism with Islamic law).
32 Ahmad, supra note 31, at 118.
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33nies, while Smith and Boerne leave the Native Americans at the mercy
of the putatively secular state legislatures.
In the case of the free exercise of religion, there is no question
that the freedom of religion, at least of the People of the Book, is
hardwired into Islamic law. 34 The question is not whether free exer-
cise is part of Islamic law, but what are its limits? Those Muslims who
wish to restrict the free exercise of religion for non-Muslims must ar-
gue that the free exercise is guaranteed only to People of the Book,
and narrow the definition of the People of the Book to only Jews and
Christians.
The argument for limiting the scope of free exercise with the
broadest appeal among Muslims is the argument for the prohibition
of polytheism. 5 The attraction of this argument in a religion in
which the founding principle is the unity of God should be self-
evident. Yet, it flies in the face of the scriptural fact that the Qur'an
forbids coercion against those who are not engaged in hostilities
against Islam and Muslims, 36 and of the historical fact that the
Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) did not drive the polythe-
ists out of Mecca on its conquest, but issued a general amnesty.
37
A second area of concern involves the overlapping issues of apos-
tasy and blasphemy. A number of Muslim scholars have argued that
the prohibition of apostasy is actually a prohibition of treason, not a
prohibition on mere conversion, but the opposite view is widely
held.38 The prohibition on blasphemy has been defended by analogy
to Western libel laws, but there is absolutely no doubt that it has been
used (or abused) as a means of silencing religious (or even political)
dissent.39
The final area of concern for free exercise in the Islamic law is the
same concern that arises in the Smith and Boerne decisions. As Noah
Feldman has put it, "no democracy, however liberal, has ever adopted
33 Id. at 110.
See supra note 2 and accompanying text for a discussion of "People of the Book."
35 See, e.g., CharlesJ. Adams, Kuft, in 2 THE OXFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE MODERN ISLAMIC
WORLD 442 (Oxford 1995) (discussing various intellectual and political movements to ban such
forms of perceived polytheism as veneration of saints, astrology, and, in extreme cases, secular
Islamic governments).
Qur'an 2:190 ("Fight in the cause of Allah those who fight you, but do not transgress lim-
its; for Allah loveth not transgressors.").
37 Ahmad, supra note 31, at 122 n.15.
See Magdi Abdelhadi, What Islam Says on Religious Freedom, BBC NEWS, http://
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/southasia/4850080.stm (last visited Apr. 1, 2006) (questioning those
Islamic scholars who endorse capital punishment for apostates when the Qur'an's text supports
freedom of belief).
s9 For a discussion of "blasphemous libel" in English law, see Kate Gilchrist, Does Blasphemy
Exist?, ART MONTHLY (Dec. 1997), available at http://www.artslaw.com.au/Publications/
Articles/97Blasphemy.asp.
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the pure liberal view that the state must refrain from regulating con-
duct that does no harm to anyone except the actor., 40 To what de-
gree are laws of general applicability to be imposed on non-Muslims?
This issue is a somewhat different dilemma for Muslims in an Islamic
state than for Christians in America. Christians are under no reli-
gious obligation to impose their views on polygamy, contraception,
homosexuality, or drug use even on other Christians, let alone on
non-Christians. Muslims, however, are accustomed to the notion of
an Islamic state charged to enforce Islamic law on Muslims. The ar-
gument that non-Muslims should be governed by their own laws is
clear in Islamic law (in the Qur'an and in the Medina compact as well
as the general practice in Muslim history) .4' Thus one can easily ar-
gue that an Islamic state must impose a strict scrutiny test before im-
posing Islamic law on non-Muslims. But how can an Islamic state not
impose Muslim law (insofar as it applies to the public sphere) on
Muslims? This question, it seems, cannot be separated from the
question of establishment of religion, which is precisely where the
distinctions between Muslim law and American law are the greatest.
So entrenched is the notion of entanglement of state and religion
in Muslim history that I am aware of no discussion of the possibility of
its separation in the pre-modern era. Let me clarify one thing before
attempting to tackle this issue. In Islam, there is no entanglement of
Church and State because in Islam there is no Church. Most Church-
State questions have to do with the desire to separate the religious es-
tablishment from the political establishment. Islam, however, has no
priesthood and, at least in Sunni Islam, there has never been the kind
of religious hierarchy such as that associated with the medieval
Catholic Church and the issues raised by its political role in medieval
42Europe. (The Shi'a hierarchy was not in a position of political au-
40 NOAH FELDMAN, AFTERJIHAD: AMERICA AND THE STRUGGLE FOR ISLAMIC DEMOCRACY 60
(2003).
41 Ahmad, supra note 31, at 110.
42 See IMAD A. AHMAD, SIGNS IN THE HEAVEN: A MUSLIMS ASTRONOMER'S PERSPECTIVE ON
RELIGION AND SCIENCE 123-29 (2d ed. 2006) (comparing the comprehensive political control
the medieval Catholic Church exercised over the dissemination of scientific ideas that ran
counter to its own theory of the universe with the relatively sporadic interventions of Muslim
polities into philosophical debate in the medieval Islamic civilization). Compare Michael E. Mar-
mura, Sunni Islam, in 4 THE OXFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE MODERN ISLAMIC WORLD 140 (1995)
(describing Sunni Islam as "not monolithic," and characterizing Sunni as comprising "a variety
of attitudes and outlooks conditioned by historical setting, by locale, and by cultural circum-
stances"), with Dennis J. Callahan, Medieval Church Norms and Fiduciary Duties in Partnership, 26
CARDOZO L. REV. 215, 221-22 (describing the central cultural, legal, and political role of the
Catholic Church in Medieval Europe, and asserting that "[tlhroughout the Middle Ages, the
Catholic Church stood at the apex of society as a centralized, hierarchical institution which took
upon itself the role of creating, applying and enforcing basic conduct norms for society" (cita-
tions omitted)).
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thority until the recent Iranian Revolution.43) The Muslim religious
scholars are in essence legal scholars, and the notion that they should
be indifferent to political issues is like saying that law professors
should refrain from issuing opinions on legislation.
Because Islam has no priesthood, no "Church" in the Christian
sense of the term, the issue for Muslims is not the relationship be-
tween Church and State, but between politics and religion. Although
it is a new idea to Muslims, I think they (we) can benefit from the
American (as opposed to the French") notion of secularism. By this I
mean that religion and politics cannot and should not be completely
separated, but that there should be no establishment of a state relig-
ion. Thus, while citizens in a democratic government can and should
bring their religious sensibilities to their positions on the issues, and
thus may subject the state to the ethics of religion, the state itself
must maintain an absolute neutrality among religious communities
and must not dictate religious practices or beliefs, neither to religious
minorities nor to the dominant religious community.
To make room for this novel, and therefore controversial, idea in
the Muslim debate, the issue must be framed within the discourse of
Islamic jurisprudence, not injected as a foreign element. Separation
benefits both religion and state, but is more important to religion. If
one looks at societies in which the state has involved itself in matters
of religion, one sees that religion has taken the harder hit. "Power
tends to corrupt and absolute power corrupts absolutely."45 An Is-
lamic state can never restrict itself to being the state of "Islam," but
becomes the state of a particular interpretation of Islam, putting at
risk not only the religious minorities, but the majority as well. It is
rulers who must be restrained by religion, and not religion that ought
to be imposed (and in the process defined) by the rulers. Consider
Saudi Arabia. It was conceived by the agreement between a religious
scholar (Muhammad ibn Abdul-Wahab) and a political leader (Mu-
hammad ibn Saud) that the former would recognize the latter's claim
to kingship in exchange for the latter's recognition of the former's
43 See Hamid Dabashi, Shi'i Islam, in 4 THE OXFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE MODERN ISLAMIC
WORLD 65-68 (1995) (detailing the events leading to, and impact of, the Iranian Revolution of
1979).
" French Secularism, or laicit6, differs from the American idea of secularism mainly in its
strict idea of church and state separation. In recent years, the French type of secularism has led
to the banning of headscarves-typically worn by Muslim girls as a part of their religious obser-
vance-in French classrooms. For a discussion of both French secularism and its application to
ban religious expression by students, see Steven G. Gey, Address, Free Will, Religious Liberty, and a
Partial Defense of the French Approach to Religious Expression in Public Schools, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 1
(2005).
45 Letter from Lord Acton to Bishop Mandell Creighton (1887), reprinted in 1 LOUISE
CREIGHTON, LIFE AND LETTERS OF MANDELL CREIGHTON 372 (1904).
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interpretation of Islam as the only correct one.46 That Saudi Arabia
prohibits the open practice of non-Muslim religions is (given the lack
of a non-Muslim citizenry) the least of its problems. Not only reli-
gious liberals, but religious reactionaries (such as Usama bin Ladin)
despise the Saudi influence in the Muslim world, an influence totally
due to its oil money and the power of its American ally.
47
CONCLUSION
In the classical era of Islamic civilization, a "completely free and
unorganized republic of scholars, 4 outside of government defined
the religious law. What is remarkable about Islamic history is not that
Islamic civilization declined, but that it lasted for so many centuries
before it declined. Islamic civilization's success is in large part attrib-
utable to the existence of a rule of law that was sufficiently fixed to
provide for rational calculation, yet sufficiently flexible to adapt to
changing circumstances, with the balance of these factors determined
outside the domain of the rulers, who had the greatest incentive and
power to distort the balance to serve their own interests. A renais-
sance of Islam in the modern era will require that it develop inde-
pendent of the government. That would be best assured by an adop-
tion of the disestablishment principle by Muslims. With an imminent
tide of democratic reform poised over the Muslim world, now is the
time for Muslims to fully discuss this issue.
46 See Eleanor Abdella Doumato, Saudi Arabia, in 4 OXFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE MODERN
ISLAMIC WORLD 4-5 (Oxford 1995) (describing the genesis of Saudi Arabia).
47 See Angilee Shah, Wahhabism, bin Ladenism, and the Saudi Arabia Dilemma, http://
www.intemational.ucla.edu/article.asp?parentid=25057 (last visited May 31, 2005) (analyzing
Saudi Arabia's "delicate balance").
48 GOITEIN, supra note 1, at 59.
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